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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court developed the political question doctrine as a 
technique to avoid judicial review of an otherwise properly filed case when a 
judicial decision in the case would be inappropriate or imprudent.
1
  It is only 
when a case is otherwise properly filed that the technique is instrumental in 
declining judicial review.
2
  Recently, the Supreme Court relied upon the 
political question doctrine to avoid adjudication of claims alleging 
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of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law for sponsoring a timely and provocative conference. 
 1 Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and 
Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2002). 
 2 Traditional procedural irregularities, such as lack of standing or failure to state a claim, avoid the 
necessity of invoking the political question doctrine.  See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 
1922 (2018) (avoiding the merits of claims alleging unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering because 
plaintiffs lacked standing); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 313 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(dismissing a case alleging unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering for failure to state a claim rather 
than by invoking the political question doctrine). 
 3 See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019) (dismissing the cases as nonjusticiable 
political questions). 
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These claims are, of course, political questions in the colloquial sense that they 
involve highly sensitive allegations that concern the fundamental values of our 
democracy.  But, if these cases were otherwise properly filed, it is important 
to consider whether the Court’s invocation of the doctrine was a prudent 
judgment or an abdication of its judicial responsibility.  Moreover, if these 
cases were susceptible to dismissal for a traditional procedural deficiency, why 
did the Court choose to decide the cases categorically—that all partisan 
gerrymander claims are political questions—rather than merely dismiss these 
particular cases?  As Professor Louis Henkin cautioned more than fifty years 
ago, “[a] doctrine that finds some issues exempt from judicial review cries for 
strict and skeptical scrutiny.”
4
  This caution is as relevant today as it was fifty 
years ago.  
The irony of the Court’s invocation of the political question doctrine in 
partisan gerrymander cases is that it relieves the courts from adjudicating issues 
that most demand independent judicial review.
5
  Indeed, the independence 
that is ensured by Article III of the Constitution is intended to protect federal 
courts when they are called upon to decide sensitive issues that might raise a 
risk of retaliation, particularly by a co-equal branch of the government.
6
  These 
protections ensure that federal judges shoulder the constitutional duty of 
judicial review without fear of reprisal.  Yet, in Rucho v. Common Cause, the 
majority refused to adjudicate claims of unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymandering, instead suggesting that any available remedy lies in the hands 
of the entrenched political bodies accused of wrongdoing.
7
  This result is 
troubling, not only because of the futility of expecting the legislative bodies that 
are responsible for the districting map to police their own alleged misconduct, 
but also because it sends a signal that the political question doctrine might be 
utilized as a convenient escape hatch to avoid adjudication of other sensitive 
issues of our day.  Indeed, what is to stop the Court from closing the 
courthouse doors on large swaths of public law litigation by declaring these 
cases to be nonjusticiable political questions? 
 
 4 Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 600 (1976). 
 5 See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2523 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he need for judicial review is at its most 
urgent in cases like these.  ‘For here, politicians’ incentives conflict with voters’ interests, leaving 
citizens without any political remedy for their constitutional harms.’  Those harms arise because 
politicians want to stay in office.  No one can look to them for effective relief.”) (citation omitted). 
 6 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, 
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”). 
 7 See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508 (“No one can accuse this Court of having a crabbed view of the reach 
of its competence.  But we have no commission to allocate political power and influence in the 
absence of a constitutional directive or legal standards . . . .”). 
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So what should courts do with cases that involve sensitive “political” 
questions?  In most cases, the answer is simple: courts should treat them like 
every other dispute by relying upon traditional tools of adjudication to resolve 
the questions presented.  When ordinary constitutional interpretation suggests 
there is no constitutional violation that is remediable by the courts, there is no 
need to invoke the political question doctrine because courts may rely upon 
traditional procedural safeguards that test the adequacy of a complaint—lack 
of standing or failure to state claim.
8
  If there are extraordinary situations that 
raise a legitimate reason for courts to avoid judicial review of an otherwise 
properly filed case, the political question doctrine should be narrowly tailored 
to satisfy clear legal principles that ensure courts shoulder the hard work of 
judicial review in all but the most extraordinary circumstances.  As the next 
section illustrates, the criteria that define the modern political question 
doctrine are not narrowly tailored or clearly defined.
9
 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION 
DOCTRINE 
The roots of the modern political question doctrine are found in Baker v. 
Carr, a case in which the Supreme Court held that allegations of 
unconstitutional vote dilution were not political questions shielded from 
judicial review.
10
  In Baker, the Court articulated the defining criteria of the 
modern political question doctrine as: 
A textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without 
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or 
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an 
 
 8 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 310 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (preferring to dismiss a partisan gerrymander 
claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, noting that “[o]ur willingness to 
enter the political thicket of the apportionment process with respect to one-person, one-vote claims 
makes it particularly difficult to justify a categorical refusal to entertain claims against this other type 
of gerrymandering.”); see also Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1213 (citing courts’ erstwhile reliance on 
standing instead of the political question doctrine). 
 9 See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the 
Federalist “Rebuttable Presumption Analysis,” 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1196 (2002) (criticizing the 
modern political question doctrine as dependent “almost entirely on the discretion of the majority of 
the Justices, untethered to any legal principles rooted in the Constitution’s structure, theory, history 
or early precedent.”). 
 10 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (“A citizen’s right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by 
state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution, when such 
impairment resulted from dilution by a false tally . . . .”). 
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unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
11
 
Superficially, the factors appear to be unproblematic—logical restrictions 
protecting the separation of powers between the politically elected branches 
of government and the independent judicial branch.  Yet, a closer look reveals 
that these criteria are too elusive to provide a principled limitation for the 
doctrine and allow courts to abdicate the judicial responsibility too freely. 
The first, and arguably most important, of the Baker criteria asks if there 
is a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department.”
12
  The Constitution defines the powers of the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches, and in Marbury v. Madison, the 
Court declared that the exercise of these powers is subject to judicial review if 
an issue is presented in a case or controversy that satisfies Article III.
13
  The 
challenge in applying the first Baker criteria, therefore, is identifying a 
“textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 




Imagine a case that involves a constitutional provision that confers 
discretion on a political branch to carry out constitutional responsibilities.  
According to Marbury, the federal courts have the power, indeed the duty, to 
interpret the constitutional provision to “say what the law is.”
15
  If a federal 
court interprets the constitutional provision and determines that there has 
been no abuse of discretion, the court has made a decision on the merits.  No 
political question arises because the court is merely engaging in ordinary 
constitutional interpretation.  Whether the court justifies the conclusion by 
determining that the constitutional provision imposes no limits on the exercise 
of discretion, or the provision imposes limits but the political branch has not 
acted beyond those limits, the court is merely employing ordinary 
constitutional interpretation to make a determination on the merits.  Political 
questions must require something different than ordinary constitutional 
interpretation. 
 
 11 Id. at 217. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
14  Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
 15 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
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Professor Louis Henkin long ago opined that a “textual commitment of 
the issue to a coordinate political department”
16
 might refer to a constitutional 
provision that is “‘self-monitoring’ and not the subject of judicial 
review.”
17
  Ordinary constitutional interpretation requires courts to answer the 
question: what is the meaning of a constitutional provision?  This is the merits 
question.  Henkin suggests, in some situations, courts may ask a related 
question: who gets to decide the meaning of the constitutional provision?
18
  In 
Marbury v. Madison, the Court emphatically established that it is the judicial 
responsibility to interpret the meaning of constitutional provisions.
19
  While 
this ordinarily means that the courts get to decide the merits question, in 
extraordinary situations a court may interpret a constitutional provision as 
conferring sole power on a political branch to decide the meaning of the 
constitutional provision.  In essence, a court concludes that the issue is a 
subject for non-judicial finality.
20
  Under this theory, if the law commits a 
subject to a non-judicial decisionmaker, the first criteria in Baker v. Carr is 
satisfied and the issue is a nonjusticiable political question. 
The second Baker criterion “a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it,”
21
 is inextricably linked to the first 
criterion.
22
  When an issue has been committed to a coordinate political 
branch, it should come as no surprise if there is a “lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving”
23
 the dispute because 
the constitutional provision at issue does not intend for judicial review.  
Conversely, an absence of manageable standards tends to support a 
conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to 
a coordinate political branch.
 24
  Of course, in most cases courts engage in 
ordinary constitutional interpretation of the sort contemplated in Marbury v. 
Madison, and it is assumed that they are capable of identifying manageable 
standards for resolving disputes that meet the requirements of Article 
 
16  Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
 17 Henkin, supra note 4, at 622–23. 
 18 See id. (summarizing the shortcomings of the political question doctrine). 
 19 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”). 
 20 See John Harrison, The Political Question Doctrines, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 459 (2017) (explaining 
that the political question doctrine applies in the unusual circumstances where the law commits final 
decision of a legal question to a non-judicial decision maker).  
21  Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
 22 See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1993) (describing the two criteria as “not 
completely separate”). 
23  Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
 24 See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–29 (noting that the absence of manageable standards “may strengthen 
the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch”). 
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III.  Indeed, courts have articulated manageable legal standards for vague 
constitutional provisions like due process and equal protection and have 
tackled the most intractable legal disputes in our nation’s history.
25
  Thus, the 
first two criteria of Baker fit together like a hand in a glove. 
The remaining Baker criteria are rarely independently determinative of 
the existence of a political question.
26
  Although the six criteria are listed in the 
alternative, the suggestion that any one of them alone would be sufficient to 
refuse judicial review of an otherwise properly filed case is implausible.  Take, 
for example, “the impossibility of deciding [a claim] without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”
27
  This “criterion” 
is nothing more than a restatement of the question: when is a properly filed 
case “clearly for nonjudicial discretion”?
28
  It is equally hard to imagine that 
judicial review can be denied solely upon a worry about “expressing the lack 
of respect due coordinate branches of government” or an “unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision,” or the “potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments.”
29
  While these considerations may be relevant in the calculus of 
deciphering when there is a “textual commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department,”
30
 it is difficult to imagine a court refusing to adjudicate 
an otherwise properly filed case solely because it may cause embarrassment 
or show disrespect to a coordinate branch. 
Notwithstanding the illusiveness of the modern political question doctrine, 
one thing is clear: the doctrine does not prevent courts from engaging in 
ordinary constitutional interpretation. 
 
 25 See id. at 247 (White, J., concurring) (noting that the word “try” in the Impeachment Trial Clause 
“presents no greater, and perhaps fewer, interpretive difficulties than some other constitutional 
standards that have been found amendable to familiar techniques of judicial construction”). 
 26 Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1213 (“[T]he Court has not invoked the more obviously flexible criteria 
articulated in Baker v. Carr—the last four of the six on its list—in any recent case, to the point where 
it seems fair to say that the only real components of the doctrine are the first two: a textually 
demonstrable commitment to the political branches and the lack of judicially manageable 
standards.”). 
 27 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
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II. ARE CLAIMS OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING 
NONJUSTICIABLE POLITICAL QUESTIONS? 
In Rucho v. Common Cause,31 the Supreme Court consolidated two direct 
appeals from federal district court decisions finding unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymandering in congressional district maps in North Carolina and 
Maryland.
32
  The Court readily admitted that “[t]he districting plans at 
issue . . . are highly partisan, by any measure”
33
 and that excessive partisan 
gerrymandering is “incompatible with democratic principles”
34
 but nonetheless 
focused its analysis on “whether the courts below appropriately exercised 
judicial power when they found them unconstitutional as well.”
35
 
The majority unequivocally rejected appellants argument that “the 
Framers set aside electoral issues . . . as questions that only Congress can 
resolve.”
36
  Noting that “our cases have held that there is a role for the courts 
with respect to at least some issues that could arise from a State’s drawing of 
congressional districts,”
37
 the majority nonetheless concluded that partisan 
gerrymander claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal 
courts.  The majority invoked the doctrine, not because of a textual 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political branch, but rather because 
it could find 
no legal standards discernible in the Constitution for making such judgments, 
let alone limited and precise standards that are clear, manageable, and 
politically neutral.  Any judicial decision on what is “fair” in this context would 
be an “unmoored determination” of the sort characteristic of a political 




 31 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
 32  See id. (adjudicating whether partisan gerrymandering violated the First Amendment, the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Elections Clause, and Article I, Section 2 of 
the Constitution). 
 33 Id. at 2491.  The evidence of partisanship was overwhelming.  In North Carolina, the co-chair of the 
redistricting committee stated “I think electing Republicans is better than electing Democrats.  So I 
drew this map to help foster what I think is better for the country.” Id.  In Maryland, the Governor 
testified that he undertook to redraw the districts “to change the overall composition of Maryland’s 
congressional delegation to 7 Democrats and 1 Republican by flipping” a district which had been 
held by a Republican for nearly two decades. Id. at 2493. 
 34 Id. at 2506 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 
2658 (2015)). 
 35 Id. at 2491. 
 36 Id. at 2495. 
 37 Id. at 2495–96. 
 38 Id. at 2500 (quoting Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012)). 
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Never before has the Court invoked the political question doctrine based 
solely upon its inability to discover legal standards to resolve a case.
39
  Although 
the first two Baker criteria are usually satisfied simultaneously, the Court 
decoupled them in this case. 
The majority attempted to support its categorical conclusion that all 
partisan gerrymander claims are political questions by weaving together 
analytical threads that fail to carry the heft of the conclusion.  While a review 
of the Federalist Papers uncovered no evidence that the Framers intended for 
the federal courts to play a role in electoral districting issues,
40
 this history 
stands in stark contrast to the majority’s own conclusion that there is a role for 
the courts with respect to one-person, one-vote and racial gerrymandering 
relating to a State’s drawing of congressional districts.
41
  The majority 
uncovered no evidence that the Framers intended to distinguish between 
different types of electoral issues, finding some justiciable, while others not. 
The majority also noted that “[c]ourts have . . . been called upon to resolve 
a variety of questions surrounding districting.”
42
  Indeed, the Court has 
answered the call in cases alleging partisan gerrymandering to reach the merits 
of the allegations.
43
  While nearly all of these cases have agreed that “extreme 
partisan gerrymandering . . . violates the constitution,”
44
 the majority 
concluded that these cases “leave unresolved whether . . . claims [of legal right] 
may be brought in cases involving allegations of partisan gerrymandering.”
45
  
These cases, in which the Court adjudicated the merits of partisan 
gerrymander claims, provide little or no support for the conclusion that it is 
impossible to find judicially manageable standards for all partisan gerrymander 
claims. 
 
 39 See id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“For the first time ever, this Court refuses to remedy a 
constitutional violation because it thinks the task beyond judicial capabilities.”). 
 40 Id. at 2496 (surveying the Framers’ consideration of the electoral districting problem and that though 
“‘a discretionary power over elections ought to exist somewhere. . . . [I]t must either have been 
lodged wholly in the national legislature, or wholly in the State legislatures, or primarily in the latter, 
and ultimately in the former.’  [But] [a]t no point was there a suggestion that the federal courts had a 
role to play.”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 362 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 41 Id. at 2495–96. 
 42 Id. at 2496. 
 43 See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (adjudicating partisan gerrymander claims on the 
merits); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986) (holding that claims of partisan gerrymandering 
are not political questions; League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) 
(adjudicating claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering). But see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 
267 (2004) (plurality opinion) (dismissing partisan gerrymander claims as nonjusticiable). 
 44 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2515 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 45 Id. at 2498 (“Two ‘threshold questions’ remained: standing, which was addressed in Gill, and 
‘whether [such] claims are justiciable.’”). 
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The majority also reviewed the tests propounded by the lower courts.
46
  Of 
course, the fact that lower courts have proposed tests does not mean the 
Supreme Court must accept those tests.  But, if lower federal courts, along 
with state courts, prior Supreme Court Justices and the dissenting Justices in 
this case are all willing and able to identify standards to decipher whether 
alleged partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional, the majority’s conclusion 
that standards are impossible to decipher is not particularly plausible. 
Finally, the majority articulates a laundry list of hypothetical questions 
involving partisan gerrymander issues that might arise in the future and might 
prove to be challenging to answer.
47
  Undoubtedly, the questions posed by the 
majority will be challenging to answer should they ever arise in a future case.  
But, this is beside the point.  Article III ensures that courts are empowered to 
answer only cases or controversies.  Indeed, the Constitution precludes federal 
courts from answering hypothetical questions decoupled from a live case or 
controversy.  It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that the majority relies upon a 
parade of horribles that have not been raised in a case or controversy, to avoid 
addressing the questions that have been properly raised.
48
 
Instead of threading the needle to reach the anomalous conclusion that 
there is a role for the courts in deciding some issues arising under the Elections 
Clause, but no judicially manageable standards to accomplish the task for 
others, the majority could have rejected the categorical declaration that all 
partisan gerrymander claims are nonjusticiable political questions and 
dismissed the specific claims regarding the district maps in North Carolina and 
Maryland for failure to state a claim upon which judicial relief may be granted.  
In Vieth v. Jubelirer, a case alleging unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, 
Justice Kennedy took this position to reject the assertion that all partisan 
gerrymander claims are political questions.
49
  Applying such reasoning here 
would have avoided any appearance of judicial abdication and still resolved 
the cases with the same result, no judicial remedy.  So why didn’t the majority 
choose this path? 
In order to dismiss these claims for failure to state a claim, a court must 
accept all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true to determine if 
 
 46 Id. at 2502–06, 2516.  (describing the tests as comprised of three basic elements: intent, effects, and 
causation). 
 47 Id. at 2501. 
 48 See id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“After dutifully reciting each case’s facts, the majority leaves 
them forever behind, instead immersing itself in everything that could conceivably go amiss if courts 
became involved.”).  
 49 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 310, 312 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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those facts state a plausible legal claim.
50
  Applying this standard, the majority 





 as true and conclude that they do not state a 
plausible claim for relief.  The majority may have been hesitant to make this 
ruling on such egregious allegations of fact.  Instead, the majority hangs its hat 
on the assertion that it is impossible to determine “how much partisan 
gerrymandering is too much?”  The dissent avoids the hypotheticals and 
concludes quite simply, this much is too much.
53
  By invoking the political 
question doctrine, the majority avoided the severity of the facts presented 




More importantly, the impact of the Court’s decision to invoke the political 
question doctrine is much greater than the impact of an individualized 
determination that these particular claims fail to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted.  By declaring that an entire category of cases—those that 
allege partisan gerrymandering—are nonjusticiable political questions the 
majority effectively lays a dead hand over all cases that might have alleged 
partisan gerrymander claims in the future.  This impact is significant.  The 
majority suggests that it is prudent, indeed necessary to categorize all partisan 
gerrymander claims as nonjusticiable political questions.  Yet, as Justice 
Kennedy stated in Vieth: 
It is not in our tradition to foreclose the judicial process from the attempt to 
define standards and remedies where it is alleged that a constitutional right is 
burdened or denied. . . . Courts, after all, already do so in many instances.  A 
determination by the Court to deny all hopes of intervention could erode 
confidence in the courts as much as would a premature decision to intervene.
55
 
The Court has struggled with partisan gerrymander claims for decades.  
While political classifications in districting alone do not support a justiciable 
claim, when such classifications are “applied in an invidious manner or in a 
way unrelated to a legitimate legislative objective,” they may support a claim 
 
 50 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (elaborating upon the standard for pleading 
in federal court). 
 51 See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2509–2511 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“In 2012, Republican candidates won 9 
of the State’s 13 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, although they received only 49% of the 
statewide vote.  In 2014, Republican candidates increased their total to 10 of the 13 seats, this time 
based on 55% of the vote.”). 
 52 See id. (observing that from 2012 through 2018 Democrats “have never received more than 65% of 
the statewide congressional vote,” yet they have won “7 of 8 House seats”). 
 53 Id. at 2521. 
 54 Id. at 2507. 
 55 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 309–10 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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for relief.
56
  After Rucho, the justiciability question will depend upon 
distinctions between partisan gerrymander claims that will likely rest upon the 
impact felt from political classifications.  To the extent that these distinctions 
are fact based, courts will be required to evaluate factual allegations relating to 
the types and severity of impact caused by partisan gerrymandering in order 
to open, or close, the courthouse doors to such claims.  In essence, these 
distinctions will be indistinguishable from the core functions of judicial review. 
In Rucho, the majority admitted that “[e]xcessive partisanship in districting 
leads to results that reasonably seem unjust” and “that such gerrymandering is 
‘incompatible with democratic principles,’”
57
 yet threw up its hands because it 
could decipher no legal standards to resolve these admittedly serious 
problems.  We should be thankful that prior justices on the Supreme Court 
discovered standards to remedy racial gerrymandering and vote dilution.  For 
that matter, we should be thankful that prior justices on the Court discovered 
standards to decipher unconstitutional conduct in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause that have been instrumental in 
advancing justice.  To prevent the Court from expanding the reach of the 
political question doctrine to shield other sensitive “political” claims from 
judicial review, the doctrine should be limited to instances in which there is a 
“textual commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.”
58
  The 
remaining criteria announced in Baker v. Carr should be relevant only to the 
extent they bear upon this determination.  In this manner, the political 
question doctrine will be narrowed to its core and applicable to only the most 
extraordinary situations.   
As Professor Henkin cautioned, “a doctrine that finds some issues exempt 
from judicial review cries for strict and skeptical scrutiny.”
59  This statement 
was true 50 years ago, and it remains true today.  We should be worried about 
a Supreme Court that refuses to engage in the hard work of judicial review, 
particularly in those cases where it is most needed. 
 
 56 Id. at 307. 
 57 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 
S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015)). 
58  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 59 Henkin, supra note 4, at 600. 
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